含义的理论（三） (5-2)

然而，这些并非对于弗雷格疑难的唯一回应。正如罗素主义者以「内涵相同的句子的含义可以不同」的观点回应 (15) 和 (16) 所引出的问题。我们也可以用「两个指称到同一对象的专名可以有不同的含义」来回应 (19) 和 (20) 的问题，从而给 (19) 和 (20) 的真值不同留出空间。此即是，支持了对弗雷格之谜的一种弗雷格式的回应，并放弃了罗素式的语义学手段(或者，至少是放弃了密尔-罗素式语义学)。

弗雷格主义者和罗素主义者一样，认为句子所表达的命题是一个有结构的实体，其组分是组成句子的各表达式的内容。但与罗素主义者不同，弗雷格主义者并不认为「这些命题成分是这些表达式所代表的对象、性质和关系」，而是认为「内容是呈现的方式（mode）、或者是思考对象、属性和关系的方式」。所谓“呈现的方式”的标准术语是涵义 Sense 。（和「内涵 Intension」一样，「涵义 Sense」有时也被用作「内容 Content」的同义词。但是，与「内涵」类似，它将「涵义」限制为「弗雷格语义学中的内容」而免于造成混淆。而「涵义这样的东西是否存在」，以及「它们是否是表达式的内容」都是有争议的。）弗雷格用一个类比来解释他关于涵义的观点：

The reference of a proper name is the object itself which we designate by its means; the idea, which we have in that case, is wholly subjective; in between lies the sense, which is indeed no longer subjective like the idea, but is yet not the object itself. The following analogy will perhaps clarify these relationships. Somebody observes the Moon through a telescope. I compare the Moon itself to the reference; it is the object of the observation, mediated by the real image projected by the object glass in the interior of the telescope, and by the retinal image of the observer. The former I compare to the sense, the latter is like the idea or experience. The optical image in the telescope is indeed one-sided and dependent upon the standpoint of observation; but it is still objective, inasmuch as it can be used by several observers. At any rate it could be arranged for several to use it simultaneously. But each one would have his own retinal image. (Frege 1892 [1960])

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