While the simple example above may seem to be“abusing”the role of the trivial key ϵ,it is easy to modify the functionality example F above so that there is exacty one non-trivial key k ∈ K that outputs π(x). The only difference to the construction above would be that the functional encrvption algorithm would outout a public-key encryption⁵ of either π(x) (in the “correct"implementation) or x (in the“incorrect"implementation), and the secret key for key k would be the secret key of the public-key encryption scheme. Again, it is easy to verify that the incorrect implementation satisfies the game-based definition.
Discussion. What does this separation show? While this is a subjective question, our view is that it shows that if the output of the functionality is supposed to have some
computational hiding properties – that is, security of your application is not only based on the information-theoretic properties of the function, but also on the computational properties of the function – then there is a real problem with the game-based formulation of security. The game-based formulation essentially ignores any computational hiding properties of the function, and therefore offers no security guaraicus that could be meaningfully combined with such computational considerations.
安全定义:有了条件1的要求,我们可以很自然的得到函数加密方案ε 的基于游戏的安全定义。对敌手 A 定义实验 b(b=0,1) 如下:
• 初始化:运行 (pp,mk) ← setup(1λ) ,并将 pp 发送给 A ;
• 询问: A 适应性地提交请求 kᵢ ( kᵢ∈K,i=1,2,. . . ),然后收到skᵢ ← Keygen(mk,kᵢ) ;
• 挑战: A 提交两个消息 m₀,m₁ ∈ X(要满足条件1),然后收到 enc(pp,mb) ;
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