solution template for the CH”, according to which the truth value of CH
must be decided by some new axiom for set theory, and to consider the
question whether CH holds or not as already definitively settled, as the result
of our knowledge of the different truth values it may assume in the different
universes of the multiverse. In (23), instead, the set-generic multiverse is
introduced in order to scrutinize the set-generic multiverse conception of
truth. According to the latter, a sentence formulated in the language of set
theory is true if it holds absolutely in the multiverse generated by V.ie., ifit
holds in cach universe belonging to that multiverse. Were one to adopt the AB) set-generic multiverse conception of truth, one should declare that a sentence
like CH lacks truth value. This is not Woodin's conclusion, however. In fact
he argues that the set-generic multiverse conception of truth is untenable
because it violates principles that he regards as essential for any notion of
truth for the set-theoretic universe (sce [23]).
However note that, despite Woodin's and Hamkins' different mathemati-
cal understanding of the multiverse, and their diverging positions as to the
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